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Abstract
Some papers have disputed when cost differentials among privately provided public goods
make income transfer policy effective. This paper clarifies the different assumptions
underlying this disputation and shows that original cost equalization is a necessary and
sufficient condition to hold the transfer neutrality.
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1. Introduction 
 
This paper examines the condition under which the neutrality of income transfer policy 
on the allocation of goods holds (hereafter referred to as the transfer neutrality). It uses a 
model with privately provided public goods, under the presence of two types of cost 
differentials. Warr (1982, 1983) formulated the transfer neutrality theorem, which states 
that the income transfer is independent of the equilibrium allocation of goods in the 
standard model of the private provision of a public good. Following Warr, the theorem has 
been highlighted because it is important in the discussion of income transfer policy.
1 Some 
researchers derived the result that income transfer will not be completely neutral under 
some general assumptions.
2 In all such papers, it was implicitly assumed that contributors 
faced the same cost when they increased the amount of public goods marginally. However, 
contributors may face different costs of contributions. When agents contribute to the public 
good, costs usually differ between agents. It is important to analyze the effect of income 
transfers under this general situation. Following this point of view, some recent papers 
(Boadway et al., 1989; Buchholz and Konrad, 1995; and Ihori, 1996) focus on cost 
differentials among contributors.   
    However, the existing analysis of cost differentials is not sufficient to obtain general and 
clear results, as the neutrality result has not been consistent. Boadway et al. (1989) has 
shown that the transfer neutrality holds in the presence of the cost differentials. In contrast, 
Buchholz and Konrad (1995) and Ihori (1996) have shown that the neutrality will not hold. 
It is important to clarify the differences between these inconsistent conclusions so that the 
effect of income transfers can be clearly discussed. 
    The main difference underlying these seemingly inconsistent conclusions is the way that 
the cost differential is created. In the model developed by Boadway et al. (1989), 
government can subsidize the private provision of public goods and the cost differential is 
created by tax deductibility or matching grants. On the other hand, in the models of 
Buchholz and Konrad (1995) and Ihori (1996), a productivity differential exists before 
intervention by the government. It is important to clarify the characteristics of each cost 
differential, which is the purpose of this paper. 
  This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and considers the 
non-cooperative Nash equilibrium of voluntary contributions to a pure public good. To 
compare existing models, section 3 derives the welfare effect of the income transfers and 
discusses the condition required to hold the neutrality.   
 
2. The Model 
 
Consider an economy with two types of heterogeneous regions, each of which 
                                                 
1  See Bergstrom and Varian (1985) for the general theorem. 
2  For example, consider the case where some agents do not contribute at all or the case where altruism is not 
pure. See Bergstrom et al. (1986) for the case with non contributors and Andreoni (1989) for the case of 
impure altruism.   2
contributes to a pure public good,  G .
3 We call this a privately provided public good. 
Therefore, the quantity of public goods in this economy becomes  G . 
  Region i  obtains utility from consumption,  x
i , and public goods. Then the utility in 
region  i   is represented by the following utility function: 
) , ( G x u U
i i i = ,                                              ( 1 )  
where both x
i  and G  are assumed to be normal goods. Each local government, by 
setting the local lump sum tax, divides fixed endowments or incomes in each region into 
the contribution to pure public goods and consumption goods. It is assumed that each 
government in each region has a linear production frontier associated with public goods 
and consumption goods. Finally, each local government faces the following budget 
constraint: 
xc gyT a x
ii i i i += −,                                                ( 2 )  
where  g
i is the level of public goods contributed by the local government in region  i , 
c
i  is  an  original cost, representing the productivity of public goods in region  i before the 
intervention of the central government,  y
i  is exogenously given income in region  i , and 
Tax
i  is an effective tax burden. Since the public good contributed by the local government 
is pure,  G   becomes equal to the sum of the quantity of contributions in each region. That 
is:  
  Gg g ≡+
12 .                                                     ( 3 )  
  Next, consider the tax and subsidy schemes of the central government. The central 
government is assumed to control the income tax level and the subsidy rate on each 
contribution of public goods (or the grants tied to privately provided public goods). Then 
the effective tax burden in region  i   is represented as follows: 
Tax ty c g
ii i i i =− β ,                                                  ( 4 )  
where  t  and β
i represent an income tax rate and a rate of subsidy to the public good 
provided by the local government  i , respectively. We assume that  01 ≤< β . As shown 
below, when this subsidy rate is different between regions, the cost differential is created 
artificially. 
Then the budget constraint of the central government becomes: 
0
2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 = − + − g c ty g c ty β β .                                       ( 5 )  
    If the subsidy rate is assumed to be exogenous, this equation determines the level of the 
income tax endogenously. 
    Substituting equation (4) into (2), we obtain:   
    xc gy t y c g
ii i i i i i i += − − () β .                                            ( 2 ) '  
Rewriting this, we have: 
     xc g t y
ii i i i +− =− () ( ) 11 β ,                                             ( 6 )  
                                                 
3  Although we present an inter-regional transfer in the model, the same results would hold for a transfer 
between agents or an international transfer.   3
where  () 1−β
ii c  is the effective and actual cost of the public good, which is constructed 
by two costs, the artificial cost, 1− β
i , and the original cost,  c
i . Further, this equation 
means that the effective cost of the public good is artificially lowered by the subsidy from 
the central government. Using equation (3), the above equation can be rewritten as: 
    xc G t yc g
ii i ii i i +− =− +−
− ()( ) () 11 1 ββ . 
  Then each local government determines the public good provision and the level of 
consumption in each region, treating the effective cost of the privately provided public 
good, the income tax rate and the contribution in the other region, as given.
4  
  In order to describe the Nash equilibrium model, the utility maximization behavior of 
each region is defined by using the following expenditure function: 
     
i i i
i i i i
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Then, the expenditure level is represented as the function of the effective cost and utility as 
follows: 
      ) ) 1 ( , (
i i i i i c U E E β − = . 
Noting normalities of goods, the expenditure function has the following sign and 
characteristics under the framework of this paper: 





i =+ − > () 10 β 、GU
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i > 0. 
Here  ) ) 1 ( , (
i i i i c U G β −  and  ) ) 1 ( , (
i i i i c U x β −  are the compensated demand function for 
the public good and consumption in each region, respectively. Using the definition of  E
i , 
equation (6) becomes: 
     
i i i i i i i i g c G c E y t ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( β β − + − − = − . 
Then the budget constraints in each region are formulated as follows: 
     
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( , ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( g c c U G c E y t β β β − + − − − = −               ( 7 - 1 )  
     
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 ) 1 ( ) ) 1 ( , ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( g c c U G c E y t β β β − + − − − = − .             ( 7 - 2 )  
Since 
2 1 ) ) 1 ( , ( g g c U G G
i i i i + = − = β , equation (7-2) gives: 














Substituting this into equation (7-1) and subtracting  g
1, we have:   
     () ( )
()
()
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which  becomes:      
( ) ()( ) () ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 1 1 1 1
22 1 11 2 22 1 11 2 1 21 2 1 −− + − − = − + −− − − βββ β β β ct y ct y c E c E c c G .  
In addition, from equations (2)' and (5), we have the following resource constraint:   
                                                 
4 In order to focus on the role of cost differentials in the transfer neutrality theorem, we assume the case of 
the inner solutions, where all agents are contributors. In the case of the corner solution, where there exists 
non-contributor in the model, transfer neutrality does not necessarily hold. See Bergstrom et al. (1986).     4
      0
2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 = − − − − + g c g c x x y y . 
Noting that  Ggg
i =+













, we obtain: 
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Finally, the model reduces to the following three equations: 
2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1
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Equation (8-1) represents the budget constraint in region 1. In particular, the right hand side 
of this equation represents the income, taking into consideration the externality effect in 
each region, referred to as an effective income. Equations (8-2) and (8-3) represent the 
public good constraint and the resource constraint, respectively. From these three equations, 
the utility level in each region and the level of the income tax rate are determined.
 5 
 
3. Welfare effects of disposable income transfers 
 
We examine the welfare effects of disposable income transfers. The income tax rate is 
assumed to be endogenous to hold the budget constraint. Totally differentiating (8-1), (8-2) 
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5  Note that budget constraint in region 2 is omitted by the Warlas Law.   5
where  dT  is defined as dt y dt y () () 11
12 −= − −, which represents the transfer of 
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becomes negative when we assume  cc
12 ≥   without loss of generality. 
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The artificial cost differential does not appear in equation (10) and the sign of equation (10) 
crucially depends on original cost differentials. The neutrality holds as long as an original 
cost differential does not exist. This corresponds to the result of Boadway et al. (1989). In 
addition, this corresponds to the results of Buchholz and Konrad (1995) and Ihori (1996), 
which prove that the income transfer is effective in the presence of the original cost 
differential. 
    First, the intuition of the reason why the original cost differential affects is 
straightforward. If cc
12 > , the income transfer from region 2 to region 1 means the 
resource allocation from the low cost region to the high cost region inefficiently. Therefore, 
the utility changes (decreases). 
Next, to understand the intuition of the reason why the artificial cost differential does not 
affect, we first examine the effect of the transfer on the tax rate. Setting  cc
12 = , we have:   









21 12 11 () ()
,                                        ( 1 1 )  
which shows that the sign of the effect on the tax rate directly depends on the sign of 
ββ
12 − . Assuming that  ββ
12 > , then the effective income in the economy increases by 
the transfer from region 2 to region 1. Therefore, the provision of public goods increases, 
which in turn increases the subsidy amounts. Through the budget constraint, the income tax 
rate increases in order to keep revenue constant. Since this increase of the income tax rate 
completely offsets the increase of the effective income in the economy, the effect of the 
artificial cost differential vanishes.   
We can summarize the results as follows. 
Proposition 1 
Even if the actual mixed cost which contributors face is the same among contributors, the 
transfer may not be neutral. Original cost equalization, that is, productivity equalization 
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before intervention by the central government (c c





This paper has examined the condition to hold the transfer neutrality in an economy with 
privately provided public goods under the presence of both artificial and original cost 
differential. In the standard model of private provision of a public good, if the cost is the 
same, the transfer neutrality holds. However, when there exists two types of cost 
differentials (artificial cost differential and original cost differential), the neutrality is 
ambiguous and should be examined. In this point of view, this paper shows that even if the 
actual mixed cost that contributors face is the same among contributors, the transfer may 
not be neutral, and original cost equalization is essential to hold the transfer neutrality. The 
results of this paper indicate that the central government should focus only on the original 
cost differential, rather than on the actual cost. The policy of income redistribution should 
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